

GAME ANALYSES

Jensen vs. Edmead *by Dylan Boggler.*

This is an analysis of a game between Erik Jensen of Denmark and Garry Edmead of England, played at the 1995 Copenhagen Open. Both players are known for their exciting play, and the game did indeed turn out to be pretty amazing.

47	54	50	56	33	35	58	57
55	42	45	23	24	34	36	25
53	37	32	31	2	10	18	17
39	38	1	○	●	7	9	12
52	48	6	●	○	5	8	15
49	51	11	13	4	3	16	20
46	30	41	26	19	14	40	21
43	28	27	22	44	29	60	59


Jensen 27 Edmead 37

Edmead, playing White, chose the Perpendicular opening at move 2, and Jensen responded with the Tiger move 3. At move 7, Jensen played the central move f4, and Edmead replied with the main-line Tiger move of 8g5.

The pair 9g4 10f3 is designed to set up a Black move of 11c6, without flipping e5. The usual continuation (the main-line Tiger) is now 12d3 13d6, followed by 14b3 15c3 16b4 – this line, in which both players are trying to remain central, is a vastly common continuation after 8g5.

The move Edmead chose, 12h4, is rarer, although it has been around for a while. The idea is to put immediate pressure on Black, by pulling to the East.

The move 13d6 solidifies the Black discs, and then 14f7 keeps up the pressure. At a casual glance, things look good for White – he has forced Black to play to the West, and he also has e7 to come.



After move 14.


What should Black do? A move like 15g3 is far too passive – 15g3 16h3 does not really help, particularly as White is still threatening e7. The right move 15 is actually to h5. At first, this seems suicidal, as Black is poisoning his entire position, but in fact this is the start of a Black edge grab that will threaten to extract all of White's discs – as we shall see.

What should White do at move 16? Black is threatening a quiet move to d3, so White plays 16g6. Black must now take back at h3, or else White will have gained too many tempos (g6 and h6). Hence 17h3, followed by 18g3 to poison a Black move to d3.

Before continuing, let us briefly examine what might actually have happened if White had taken the edge with 16h6. If Black takes his quiet immediately with 17d3, then White can respond 18e7, flipping the e5 disc and so gaining access to


h7 and also to c2 (threatening to play both c2 and c3). This seems rather close. A better sequence for Black is probably to start with 17g6, which forces White to play 18h7 so as to prevent 19d3 – note that 18e7 19d3 would leave White without access to h7. White now has to be careful about the Stoner trap threat, and also about being poisoned – for example, a sequence like 19e2 20d2 21h3 22h2 23g3 seems to leave Black ahead.

Returning to the game, the position after move 18 might again suggest that Black is dead – everything is poisoned. However, he aims to extract White's discs from the East – White, he hopes, will soon be left with almost no discs to the East, and this should result in White having few legal moves. This is the 'large mass' idea – a form of chequerboarding. So Black plays 19e7. This more or less forces 20h6, both to stop Black playing there and to gain access to d8, followed by 21h7 and 22d8. Note how Black is starting to extract the White discs, while retaining his free move at h2.



After move 22.

innovation – Black usually plays 25d1, extracting White discs and leaving h2 for later. The nice idea behind 25h2 is that Black has not yet opened up at all to the North (as opposed to say 25d1), and this gives White less flexibility.



After move 29.

Black has an interesting choice at move 23. He could extract the White disc at g4, which is giving White access to d7, by playing 23e2 – followed for example by 24f2 25f1. Alternatively, he could play 23d2, so as to extract the g5 disc and retain the capability to extract g4 later. Of course, 23d2 allows White to play to d7 but, as we shall see, Black has a response to that.


Black chose 23d2, and White replied 24e2, trying to get some moves to the North. Black now took his free move, playing 25h2. This is an

At move 26, White took his d7 move. It seems that White's position is fine – he is right back in the game, with plenty of internal discs. But Black now has the wonderful sequence 27c8 28b8 (forced, to avoid loss of tempo) 29f8! This kind of thing is very thematic in this opening; Black is aggressively removing the White discs. Suddenly White has almost no discs, and almost no legal moves. This shows the power of Black's innovation at move 25.

What should White do at move 30? A move like c1 is no good – Black can just play 31f2, for example. And 30d3 just yields

31c7, with White to move again. But White has so few discs – can he not exploit this? White found a very nice move: 30b7. The idea of this daring open-board X-square is to gain access to d3 in a tempo-gaining way (for example, if 31f7 then 32d3). Note that if Black ever grabs the a8 corner then White can wedge at e8.


At move 31, Black sensibly plays to d3, to stop White playing there. This move also extracts more of White's Eastern discs, and so keeps the pressure on. White is still very short of moves. He cannot afford to play for example 32b5, as that would just be met by 33b4. He played 32c3 – making it Black's turn to move and allowing no nice Black moves to the West. This move also denies Black access to c7, for the moment. Of course, this 32c3 completely seals White off from the West, so he must be prepared to cope with a Black pull to the North. Black did indeed play 33e1, to pile up the pressure on White.




After move 33.

Can White try to gain a tempo with 34f1 35g1 36f2? Certainly not, as Black would simply respond with 37d1. What about 34f1 35g1 36d1 37c1 38c2? This looks more promising, but unfortunately there is a deadly Black response: 39b4! This simultaneously removes White's access to f2 (the c5 disc) while gaining undeniable Black access to f2 (via the d2 disc). Since Black would also still have a free move to b1, White would be dead. This demonstrates the sort of thing that is possible with a 'large mass'.


So what should White do at move 34? He found the elegant solution of 34f2 35f1 36g2. This gets him out of the immediate tempo-problem in the North. However, it is now very difficult for White to play to the North again – c2 is out for ever, and c1 or d1 would make it impossible for him to wedge at g1 if Black grabbed h1.



After move 36.



After move 39.



After move 40.

So Black played 37b3 38b4 39a4, to keep enormous pressure on White. This

time, it seems that White is finally dead. He has been run out of moves for about the third time, and of course his Northern moves are a disaster. He could try 40a3 41a2 42b5, but Black just replies 43c2. What can he do?

White found a remarkable move: 40g7. Even among X-square sacrifices, this one stands out as particularly beautiful. Let us see what is going on. Can't Black just grab the corner with 41h8? Yes, but then White replies 42g8, which does *not* flip the f7 disc, and hence does not give Black access to e8. Indeed, if there had been a White disc on the b3-f7 mini-diagonal, then g7 would not work at all, for this very reason – White couldn't reply to h8 with g8, and he couldn't just leave the g8 square, because Black would be threatening the sequence a8-e8-g8. So this move 40g7, White's third corner sacrifice, can only possibly work if White is *sure* that he will never have to put a disc on the b3-f7 line.

Black played 41c7, and now what should White do? He has lots of control, but of course he must not flip anything on the b3-f7 line. White found a game-ending move, namely 42b2! He has now played all four X-squares – what is the point of this one? The idea is that Black is completely run out of moves. If Black plays 43c2 then White responds 44a3, still controlling the diagonal and, most importantly, *not* flipping b4. The move to a3 does put a piece on the b3-f7 line, but this doesn't matter since Black has no access to h8.

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	○	●	●	●	●	○	●
	○	○	○		●		

After move 42.

Let us go back to the position after move 38. Can Black prevent what happened to him? After move 40 he is certainly finished, as whatever he plays to the West flips both c5 and c6, thus allowing 42b2 to work as in the game. What about at move 39? Black can poison g7, once and for all, by playing to c7 immediately.

So what would have happened after 39c7? The key point in this position is that White has no access to b5. So he doesn't have many things to try, especially given his inability to play to the North. A move of 40d1 would simply be met by 41c2 (with c1 to come), while 40c1 would fail to 41d1 and 40a3 to 41c2. White could try 40e8, hoping for 41h8 42b5 and perhaps a parity win, but he would have sacrificed far too much – 41a4 would win easily for Black. Finally White

could try 40b6, but then Black can reply 41a4, followed by 42a3 43b5 44a5 45c2 and winning easily – for example, 46d1 47a6 48a7 49c1 is a simple win for Black. Thus 39c7 would have led to a Black win, essentially because White has sacrificed too much already and has no control-gaining tricks.

One strange spectator at the tournament was a rather short gentleman who claimed to have come from a mountain pass between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The players christened him the Khyber low man.

Editor's Computer-Aided Endgame Note.

Woe is Mr. Boggler; the ending after 46 is not as routine a White win as he believes. Here is the position with Black to play at 55.

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○	○	●	○	○	○	○	●
●	○	●	●	○	○	○	●
●	○	○	○	○	○	○	●
●	○	○	○	○	○	○	●

After move 54.

Black chose 55a2, securing most of the West edge, rather than 55d1, gaining the North edge. After 55a2 56d1, Black just had to play first into both of the remaining pairs, and nothing good happened to him. But after 55d1 56a2 57h1 58g1, suddenly 59h8 turns all the way along the diagonal, and 60g8 is only a draw! The problem is of course that White has sacrificed an awful lot with his four X-squares, and although White has parity and control, it only takes one little accident like this to save the game.

This was only a fleeting opportunity. White had a win the move before with 54d1. Now the obvious line is 55b1 56a2 57h1 58g1 59h8 60g8 30–34; the difference between this and the sequence above is mainly that White gets most of the discs in row 2 with d1-b1-a2 rather than b1-d1-a2. Alternatively, Black can try 55h1, when either 56b1 or 56g1 win, although 56a2 only draws.

In fact, it was tight all the way through the ending. Here are the perfect play sequences:

50b1 h8 g8 b6 a5 h1 g1 d1 a3 a2 c1, 29–35

49a5 c1 a6 a2 b1 a3 h8 g8 d1 b6 h1 g1, 31–33

48b1 a6 b6 b5 a3 h8 g8 a2 a5 c1 d1 h1 g1, 29–35.

In the 49a5 line above, every White move is the only win.

Moves 42–47 were all perfect, but there's much more to the position after move 40 than meets the eye. First, let's look at 41b5. The idea here is that what's left of the South is really very unpalatable for White, and, after 42b2, if Black can just keep playing into the odd North region he may just about hang on. A typical line would be:

41b5 b2 c2 a3 b1 a1 a2 c1? d1 a5 b6 and now White is going to be swindled in the South no matter what – e.g., 52g1 h1 a6 a8 g8 h8 e8 c7 (P) a7, 36–28. But in fact White has a rather astonishing improvement, namely 48d1: this looks

completely irrelevant, but watch what happens: 48d1 c1 g1 h1 e8 a8 c7 g8 h8 b6 a5 (P) a6 (P) a7, 29-35. And this is enough to make 41b5 a loss.

But Black does have a way to stop this working, namely to start with 41h1! This has to be done right now, while White has to reply with 42g1, since everything else disturbs the b3-f7 diagonal, with consequences as described in the text. Now Black plays 43b5, White doesn't have the trick as above, and we get: 43b5 b2 c2 a3 b1 c1 d1 a1 a2 a5 a6 a7 h8 g8 e8 c7 b6 (P) a8, 34-30, or 43b5 c2 d1 b2 c1 a3 a2 e8 a8 c7 g8 a5 b6 a1 b1 a6 h8 a7, 33-31.


Obviously there's a lot more going on, but Black really is winning.

White has nothing better at 40, so 39a4 is actually a winning move. However, I can confirm that 39c7 is Hewlett-correct, and a far more convincing win.

Some Games from Brussels by *Graham Brightwell*.

55	54	41	51	53	34	59	60
47	48	38	50	52	17	58	30
32	49	39	7	5	14	12	19
35	31	23	○	●	4	11	20
33	28	3	●	○	1	15	18
36	40	6	2	9	8	13	16
45	42	22	10	21	29	57	56
43	44	37	25	26	24	27	46

Brightwell 44 Edmead 20




Black to move at 35.

This is (a) the first time I've beaten Garry in eight attempts, and (b) one of the few games in the tournament where I didn't try (usually unsuccessfully) to throw it away in the endgame. Move 17f2 is almost certainly not very good, but I'm keen to avoid the line that Garry hit Imre Leader and me with at the last Nationals. All through the 20s, I'm faced with the choice of either taking the edge, and having a horrible position, or leaving it to him, and putting up with him having another tempo at f1 to follow. I decide to live dangerously, and Garry decides to wait until I'm forced to give up the chance to meet h2 with g7. The key point of the game arises when Garry piles on the pressure with 34f1 (see diagram). I am faced with the problem that he also threatens e2, meeting e1 with d1, for yet another tempo. I could try 35b3 or 35c3, but after 36e2 I'd have to use up the c8 tempo as well, which looks awful. So I play 35a4, which seems to be one tempo worse, but the point is that after 36a6 37c8 his move to e2, and indeed every other move in sight, is poisoned. If 36e2, then I can play 37a2 and preserve the c8 tempo. Another idea, which I didn't consider, is to play 35b6, planning to meet b8 with c8, and give up the South edge in return for the


wedge at h7. The position at 40 is a classic example of how White's edges can poison all his moves. The only drawback of this as an illustration is that White can actually win with 40d2; don't ask me why. Having missed this, Garry dies rapidly - I am only too happy to give up the South edge, and the f1 move has left him with a permanent odd region in the NE.

59	60	33	37	34	36	35	56
58	39	31	32	22	24	55	51
57	14	18	7	5	21	11	52
16	13	12	○	●	4	20	26
27	15	3	●	○	1	8	46
28	30	6	2	9	10	47	23
49	38	29	17	19	25	50	48
45	42	43	59	40	41	44	53



Brightwell 33 Caspard 31

Black to move at 39.



Black to move at 55.

This is my game with Caspard from the Swiss. Move 8 is a very old move that some of the French have been experimenting with recently. This is the way I played against Caspard in Cambridge, through 21, and it looks effective to me. I don't think I made the best of the position here (although that didn't stop me repeating the line obsessively in the third game of the Final), and the best I can say is that if he didn't have 38b7 then he would be in trouble. As it is, nothing in the NE is going to cut the diagonal in any remotely acceptable way, so I'm drawn to the desperation shot of 39b2. The idea is that, yes, he will cut, but I plan to meet a1 with a3, then if he plays either b1 or a2 I have the option of leaving the other, gaining parity. Of course, I'll lose the North edge and he'll run round the East. Also, the plan doesn't work if he goes straight for a1-a3-b1, before I get to a8 and a7, when I have to play a2 immediately.

But the idea did cast sufficient doubt and confusion into his mind that he decided not to go for a1. Independent of that, 42b8 can hardly be the right way to go. By 47, I'm winning. (42a1 wins 38-26, 43h5 is a draw, 46a1 is a 33-31 win.) Then the gremlins got into the works at 55. This is not all that easy, and there was a bit of time pressure, but I ought to get it right. I'm obviously extracting some discs with a3 and g2, and losing a lot in the North, but there's a right and a wrong way to go about it. The wrong way is 55g2, as that lets him play 56a1 - then if I go for 57a3 he gets the last three moves, whereas 57b1 lets him clean up in the North with 58h1 59a3 60a2. The right way is 55a3 56a1 57g2, when I either keep the North edge after 58h1-b1-a2, or get the last move in the NW (thematic) with 58a2-b1-h1. Fortunately, this game followed the standard pattern for the tournament, and Emmanuel lost the plot too.

AROUND THE BOARD IN 60 MOVES

50	49	42	39	34	40	60	58
51	43	27	33	31	32	53	48
38	29	3	4	24	8	37	35
44	25	5	○	●	6	28	36
57	26	16	●	○	1	13	30
45	22	17	2	9	7	12	19
54	56	20	11	10	14	47	46
55	41	18	23	15	21	59	52

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		○	○	○	○		
	●	●	●	○	○		
○	●	●	○	●	●	●	●
	○	○	●	○	●	●	○
	○	○	●	●	●	●	○
	○	○	●	●	●	●	●
		●	○	●	●		
	●	●	●	●	●		

White to move at 44.

This is the first and best game of the Final. Move 19 is new to me. At first sight, it looks good, as the South edge doesn't play very well for me now, but in fact I survived easily enough playing the obvious moves, and I'm clearly ahead all through the midgame. His 27c2 looks wrong. Perhaps I ought to take the South edge at some stage, but there always seemed to be something better to do. As it was, he stayed alive, and it became apparent that even though I was White I was going to have to make something happen. In the diagrammed position, 44a4 was just a drifting move, and after 45a6 it was too late. I don't have anything better than what I played, 46h7, when 47h8 loses but 47g7 doesn't. I can keep it tighter with 48a2, but that's not a very enticing prospect. The way to do it is to preserve my options at 44, and play 44h7 immediately: 45h8 still loses, but the main difference is shown by the perfect play line 45g7 h2 a6 a2 a1 b1 a4 h8 g8 a8 g2 g1 h1 a7 b7 a5.

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Me(to move) v. Plowman

To finish, here is the embarrassing end to a dreadful game, which had eight game-losing blunders in the final twenty moves – here come the last pair. His previous mistake was to give me parity by leaving a one-square region at b2 where he has no access. So 55g2 is a natural and easy win; I even get another swindle with 55g2 h1 g1 (P) h7 (P) g7 (P) b2, 38–26. But I go for the East edge with 55h7?. Fortunately, he plays the routine 56g7? and loses 35–29 after 57h1 58g2 59g1 (P) 60b2. The right move is 56g1, taking away

my access to g7, regaining parity, and winning 33–31 after 57h1 58g2 59b2 60b7.

If you think that was embarrassing, then I assure you that there is one double blunder from this tournament that makes this look grandmasterly, and ranks up there with the legendary Swedish night club photos. Unfortunately, the editor tells me that we don't have the space to include this example.